Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Mali Case Study by Desgrais, Nicolas & Guichaoua, Yvan
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Desgrais, Nicolas and Guichaoua, Yvan  (2018) Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Mali
Case Study.     UK Stabilisation Unit
DOI




This report has been produced by an independent expert. The views contained within do not 







Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: 
 Mali Case Study 
 
 



























Yvan Guichaoua is a lecturer in International Conflict at the Brussels School of International Studies 
(University of Kent) and has been carrying out research on political violence in the Sahel since 2007. 
Nicolas Desgrais is a PhD candidate in International Conflict at the Brussels School of International 
Studies (University of Kent). His research explores regional security cooperation in West Africa. 
In addition to contemporary political and historical scholarship on Northern Mali, the authors draw 
on personal material accumulated in the last years in their work on the region. However, given the 
challenges in collecting reliable data in Mali, the report clearly distinguishes between confirmed 
information coming from reliable sources and more speculative yet plausible assertions.  
 
Background to Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project 
This case study is one of a series commissioned to support the Stabilisation Unit’s (SU) development 
of an evidence base relating to elite bargains and political deals. The project explores how national 
and international interventions have and have not been effective in fostering and sustaining political 
deals and elite bargains; and whether or not these political deals and elite bargains have helped 
reduce violence, increased local, regional and national stability and contributed to the strengthening 
of the relevant political settlement. Drawing on the case studies, the SU has developed a series of 
summary papers that bring together the project’s key findings and will underpin the revision of the 
existing ‘UK Approach to Stabilisation’ (2014) paper. The project also contributes to the SU’s growing 
engagement and expertise in this area and provides a comprehensive analytical resource for those 






This report discusses the failure of Mali’s 2006 Algiers Accord. It places it within the broader context 
of Malian politics, which have been characterised by cycles of violent mobilisation driven by Tuareg 
aspirations for autonomy, followed by initiatives to promote peace. Recurring episodes of armed 
violence in Mali’s Northern regions since independence have been driven by multiple causes, which 
a series of peace processes, including the one that led to the signing of the 2006 Accord, have failed 
to address. The culmination of these failures led to a major crisis in 2012 when Tuareg separatists 
occupied Mali’s three Northern provinces, followed by a rise in jihadi movements operating in the 
country.  
The cyclical nature of war and peace in Mali since independence is, itself, an indicator of the limited 
impact of peacebuilding attempts in the country. In fact, this paper argues that elite bargains aimed 
at ending conflict have instead planted the seeds of new rounds of conflict, as they have 
systematically failed to reconfigure the political settlement and address the core drivers of 
contestation. 
The build up to an elite deal and its impact on the political settlement 
Tensions in Northern Mali are rooted in postcolonial centre-periphery political inequalities. At the 
time of independence, certain sections of the Tuareg communities were reluctant to be considered 
part of the Malian polity and engaged in competitive violence against the state. State repression, 
economic hardship and political marginalisation exacerbated these polarising dynamics. 
In the late 1980s, Tuareg activists returned from exile in Libya and triggered a rebellion. The 
insurgency soon fragmented along tribal lines, but yielded an ambitious peace agreement followed 
by effective local community-level agreements.  
However, failure to implement provisions of the peace process, as well as exclusive appropriation by 
elites of the ‘dividends of peace’ through re-arranged, state-endorsed and short-term bargains, 
eventually led to renewed violence in 2006. Peace talks in the wake of the rebellion provided no 
more than a band aid, and failed to deter some Tuareg rebel leaders from continuing to conduct hit 
and run attacks against Malian government forces while at the same time carving out influence in 
the profitable cross-border smuggling business.  
In response to persistent instability, the government armed ethnic militias recruited from Arab and 
Tuareg groups, who had remained loyal to the central authorities and, who were actively protecting 
their business interests. This took place alongside the rise of Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a 
jihadi group whose origins lay in the Algerian civil war. AQIM became part of a web of criminalised 
security actors countering Tuareg separatist aspirations alongside (but not politically aligned with) 
pro-government militias.  
Therefore, the post-2006 era corresponded with a significant reconfiguration in the previous set of 
elite bargains and wider settlement. New Islamist actors infiltrated this process and carved out their 
own political influence and discreet bargains, notably through the kidnapping of Westerners. 
The role of external actors 
In the recent decades, political dynamics in the Sahara have been shaped by two major regional 





Algeria has consistently been the promoter of peace processes in Mali yet has exported its jihadi 
militants there; while Qadhafi’s Libya mediated conflicts yet also exacerbated Tuareg nationalism.  
While Libya’s influence significantly declined with Qadhafi’s fall, Algeria remains central to 
contemporary political settlements in Mali. However, its involvement now takes place in parallel to 
initiatives from more distant foreign powers, including a UN mission, the US and, crucially, France, 
the ex-colonial power. These foreign powers have not been impartial and, as a result, have added a 
new layer of strategic confusion to an already complex Malian crisis. 
The durability of the bargains 
The ongoing peace process in Mali remains highly fragile and based on exclusive and unstable deals 
and bargains amongst the various elites. Genuine, sustainable peacebuilding has not occurred to 
date, despite ambitious peace agreements signed in 1992, 2006 and 2015. Instead, a form of 
governance is in place that relies on a fragile “managed” balance between different elite interests, 
each representing – albeit unequally – Mali’s multiple Northern communities. Violence, and 
attempts to contain it, are integral to this short-term approach to maintaining order, as is the 
ongoing international support for the Malian government.  
At the same time, broad-based coalitions have cyclically challenged the government of Mali’s 
authority against a backdrop of social, economic and political tensions between the centre and the 
periphery. Yet the periphery is, itself, a highly contested political arena, leading to communal feuds 
that are easily exploited by the government as a counterinsurgency strategy and requiring tailored, 













Introduction: Building long term peace or managing political violence? 
This report focuses on events before and after the 2006 Algiers Accord (not to be confused with the 
2015 Algiers Accord) that achieved little in addressing conflict drivers. Instead, it resulted in a 
reconfigured deal, which exacerbated existing grievances by empowering a new group of elites. It 
places this failed attempt at peace within a broader historical and political context. The analysis 
begins with events in the early 2000s, a decade after the end of rebellion that hit the country in the 
1990s and resulted in an ambitious peace agreement, and ends in 2015, with another peace deal 
that aimed to end a large-scale rebellion that had been triggered in 2012. The events of 2006 remain 
pivotal, as they ushered in major changes in Northern Mali’s political economy.  
The multiple uprisings and peace deals that have occurred in Mali since independence in 1960 
underscore failures in peacebuilding efforts in Northern Mali. In fact, this paper argues that elite 
bargains aimed at ending conflict actually planted the seeds of a new round of conflict. Episodes of 
conflict and corresponding agreements do not mark a neat separation between periods of war and 
peace. Instead, they are inscribed in a no war, no peace sequence, partly resulting from central 
authorities’ specific ways of governing Mali’s periphery. Both rebel forces and central authorities 
have constantly contested the fragile governance in the North, maintaining a prolonged state of low 
intensity violence.  
Protagonists of recurring crises: key actors 
This section presents an overview of politically active groups during the past and present crises. 
While the political protagonists have not varied significantly over the years, their relative influence 
has changed. Their changing positions in the (often armed) competitive political economy of 
Northern Mali are both the outcome and source of recurring processes of violent mobilisation. 
Arrangements among competitors in Northern Mali’s political economy never last long. The 
following section presents some of the characteristics of the interactions between key political 
actors of Northern Mali. 
Complex alliances in Northern Mali society are comprised of relatively small groups (tribes or 
families), who’s internal organisations rely heavily on individual agency: youth and women, for 
instance, all have a say. It is common to find families whose members have different political 
preferences, and, in times of crisis, support different armed factions. Political alignment, therefore, 
has to be understood at a micro-level. Similarly, alliances between groups often derive from complex 
marital arrangements or personal friendships or enmities.  
For the sake of simplicity, we can state that in Northern Mali, political alignments and violent 
mobilisation essentially follow parochial, tribal lines. On the military front, this may translate into 
small groups of fighters, sometimes comprised of just 200 men and a dozen pickup trucks, attached 
to a given territory (terroir).1 These basic units of loyalty remain fairly stable and their cohesion is 
ensured by blood ties and patronage – which carries far greater weight than any acronym the group 
may choose for itself.  
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In arid areas, tribal groupings are particularly strong. However, no tribe can live in isolation. 
Therefore, along with strong tribal bonds, each group is forced to develop connections beyond the 
clan as a condition of survival in the desert.2 These connections are implemented through alliances 
that are firmly rooted in religious networks and enforced by cadis (Islamic judges) who play an 
essential role in adjudicating disputes. 
Alliances are volatile and not always obviously ‘rational’.3 They have roots in past interactions and 
cannot be undone instantly. Furthermore, honour and personal rivalries constrain the feasibility of 
these alliances. As a result, unity among rebels is the exception rather than the rule. Broad-based 
movements generally rely on minimal convergence of political agendas, and soon fragment along 
parochial lines when the terms of the broad deal with the government are irrevocably set and ‘peace 
dividends’ are in sight. As a result, peace-making requires efforts on multiple levels. Progress may be 
obtained by an overarching deal between the centre and the rebellious faction on the periphery, but 
it will need to be complemented by a series of local deals among subnational elites in order for 
peace to be preserved. 
Armed rebellion is a common means of political dispute, although more peaceful ways of voicing 
dissent also exist. Carrying arms or being protected by armed men is another condition of survival in 
the Sahara. Saharan communities have a military culture and do not lack youth disposed to enforce 
it. Hit and run attacks on domestic military posts have historically been the main source of acquiring 
military supplies, with cross-border smuggling as a second source. In the case of the latter, the rapid 
transfer of arms from Libyan stockpiles in the summer of 2011 is the most emblematic case. 
Traditional leaders historically played a significant role in channelling people’s discontent. However, 
their authority is dramatically declining as they have been replaced by armed leaders, even though 
they may, symbolically, seek approval from traditional leaders for their actions. 
The following section outlines the six key tribal groupings present in Northern Mali: the Ifoghas, the 
non-Ifoghas Tuaregs, the Imghads, the Arabs, the sedentary communities, and the Fulani. They have 
varying relations with a seventh political actor, the Government of Mali, which is seen by 
international actors as the legitimate authority in Northern Mali – even if this is not always the case 
among domestic actors. Three external actors are then outlined: Algeria, Libya and France. A final 
actor, AQ in the Islamic Maghreb, is a hybrid movement that was originally composed of Algerians 
but increasingly drew on locals.  
Domestic actors 
The Ifoghas tribe and their immediate allies are concentrated geographically around Kidal, the 
country’s most northern city. Their locality entertains more economic and social ties with Algeria 
than with the rest of Mali. The Ifoghas are nobles in the Tuareg hierarchy (which also comprises, 
historically, tributaries, blacksmiths and slaves) and they enjoy considerable religious credentials 
through their reputed scholars and history. The Ifoghas enjoyed relative privilege under French 
colonisation, at the expense of more southern Tuareg tribes, and resented the ‘treason’ of 
decolonisation. It left them officially attached to Mali, whose capital was thousands of kilometres 
away, and whose post-independence socialist agenda promised to combat such ‘feudal’ powers as 
represented by the Ifoghas. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Ifoghas have been extremely active in all 
the rounds of rebellion, and their military leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, commanded the Tuareg rebellion in 
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the 1990s. In the wake of this rebellion, Iyad Ag Ghaly re-established some ties between the Ifoghas 
and the Government of Mali but did not restore the Ifoghas’ past political glory and became a 
contested political figure in Kidal. He gradually got closer to Islamist movements before fully 
endorsing jihad in late 2011, leaving his Ifoghas followers divided between nationalist and religious 
claims. 
Non Ifoghas Tuaregs belong to a number of different tribes (including the Kel Ansar, Iwillimeden, 
Dawsahak, Chamanamass and Idnans), and are not as politically active or visible as the Ifoghas. All, 
with the exception of the Imghads (see below), have geographical strongholds, claim a terroir 
(territory), and occupy varying economic specialisations, including cattle breeding, trade and public 
office. These communities often play crucial roles in violent uprisings by holding territory and 
mobilising assets. For instance, the Dawsahak significantly contributed to arming the rebellion in 
2012 by selling huge numbers of cattle. Politically, these tribes have the most volatile alignments. 
For instance, they might take up arms to defend an overarching Tuareg agenda against the central 
government and then defect if they do not feel represented enough in the rebellion or if the 
government offers them specific advantages. They might also individually contest existing political 
settlements and elite bargains by disrupting order in their respective territory. 
The Imghads are not a tribe per se: the name designates a political identity operating much like a 
tribal identity, but does not correspond to a precise geographical territory. However, Imghads 
represent a significant proportion of Kidal’s population. At independence, the “anti-feudalism” 
agenda of the socialist government made them natural allies of the central authorities against the 
Ifoghas, to whom they had traditionally paid tribute. Their leader, El Hadj Gamou, actually fought 
against Iyad Ag Ghaly in the 1990s despite having joined him earlier in the rebellion. The same 
cleavage between Ifoghas and Imghads deepened in 2009 and the following years after El Hadj 
Gamou received a mandate from the Government of Mali to restore order in the North. The 
Imghad/Ifoghas divide has been a defining fault-line among Northern actors for several decades 
now, with the Imghads now firmly siding with the Government of Mali. 
Arabs in Mali are socially stratified in a way that is similar to Tuareg social stratification. Their tribes 
are multiple and their territorial presence well delineated, with separate groupings around 
Timbuktu, Kidal, Ber, Arawan and Gao. Some groups are traditionally subaltern, and consequently 
aspire to social promotion. Others belong to the political and religious nobility. Most Arab tribes 
have sided with the government but differ from Tuareg groups in two key areas. First, they have 
developed massive and profitable cross-border networks of trade, some of them forming 
internationally connected drug cartels. Second, they have acted as the primary vector for jihadi 
entrenchment in Northern Mali. 
Sedentary groups are concentrated along the bend of the Niger river and mostly comprise Songhoys 
and Bellahs. They either farm or earn their livelihoods in urban areas, particularly around Gao. 
Songhoys consider themselves the legitimate autochthones (‘sons of the soil’) and have regularly 
mobilised self-defence groups under this banner, protecting themselves from proximate rebellions. 
As a result, they have tended to side with the state, which they see as the lesser of two evils, and 
which armed them in the 1990s and helped them form the Ganda Koy militia. The Bellahs are freed 
slaves previously owned by Tuaregs. While anti-slavery activism has occasionally brought them to 
the fore of the political scene, they tend to be systematically side-lined in peace negotiations.  
Fulani groups are generally considered pastoralists, although large sections of Fulani society have 





pastoralist segment, which competes for access to pastures with a number of Tuareg groups, notably 
the Dawsahak in the region close to the border with Niger. Violent clashes between Fulanis and 
Dawsahak over cattle theft or access to wells have been commonplace since the late 1970s. For the 
most part, they tend to side against the Tuaregs and align with the Government of Mali, although 
not always enthusiastically in a context in which post-independence state formation did not favour 
them. More recently, some of them have started joining jihadi groups, whose Fulani leaders have 
revived memories of the past splendour of the Islamic Macina empire of the early 19th century. 
The Government of Mali’s legitimacy in the North of the country is disputed by a number of actors, 
not least as a result of the government’s heavy-handed repression against rebels following 
independence. Although a push towards conciliatory solutions was introduced in the wake of the 
1990s rebellion, the process was piecemeal, non-inclusive and relied on limited financial resources. 
The decentralisation process, which was considered the main driver of peaceful change, generated 
more divisions and opportunities for corruption. In the mid-1990s, and later on in 2006 and the 
following years, a new strategy to govern the North was introduced, which consisted of using loyal, 
Northern proxies to counter separatist influences.  
Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb and its affiliates was originally comprised exclusively of Algerian 
militants rejecting the amnesty package offered by the Algerian authorities to end Algeria’s bloody 
war in the 1990s. The then-called Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat found relatively safe 
ground in Northern Mali, where they became increasingly entrenched through marital alliances and 
economic influence. The latter was largely as a result of a highly profitable hostage-taking business. 
Counter-terrorism efforts to dislodge them proved inefficient and their spread reached a climax in 
2012, when they governed two thirds of Malian territory and sought to impose Sharia Law on 
populations under their control, in alliance with some Tuareg and Arab political leaders.  
External actors 
Algeria has had an opaque strategy toward Northern Mali that is hard to decipher by outsiders, and 
multiple conspiracy theories abound as a result. Algeria’s official doctrine since independence has 
been one of non-interference in sovereign countries’ political affairs. More pragmatically, however, 
Algeria pays close attention to what is happening on its doorstep for several reasons: first, Mali and 
Niger are allies of their former coloniser, France; second, while he was still in power, they recognised 
a need to counter Qadhafi’s diplomatic efforts to woo Mali; third, they want to keep their own 
Islamists in exile at bay; and fourth, they want to contain eventual unrest in Southern Algeria, which 
has close economic, cultural and social ties with Northern Mali’s communities. Algeria is regularly 
invited to mediate Malian crises and has initiated multiple rounds of negotiations. It was once 
considered close to Iyad Ag Ghaly, but this has not been consistently observed over the time. The 
question of which Malian player Algeria supports at any point feeds endless speculation that is rarely 
backed up by proof.  
Libya is no longer the power broker it aspired to be a decade ago, after then-President Qadhafi 
travelled to Timbuktu with the intention of opening a Libyan consulate in Kidal. However, the Libyan 
territory continues to play a crucial role in Northern Mali’s security. Rebellions in 1990 and in 2012 
were made possible as a result of substantial support coming from Libya, and the 2009 rebellion was 
arguably stopped after Libya offered residence to its leader, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. In the wake of the 






France has had a complex relationship with Malian authorities as well as Tuareg militants. The myths 
of the noble Tuareg warrior and the Meharist colonial officer4 have consistently attracted sympathy 
among the French military and French public opinion. This, combined with geopolitical interest 
(including French uranium exploitation in Niger and the preservation of a sphere of political 
influence against Algeria), translated into support for rebels in the 1990s, while the exact nature of 
French involvement in the 2012 crisis remains unclear. The return of Malian fighters from the 
Qadhafi Islamic Legion, which led to the rebellion, was de facto undermining resistance to French 
bombings in Libya in 2011. Later, when the French intervened to drive out the jihadis, it used the 
Tuareg rebels as auxiliaries and eventually secured their return to their Kidal stronghold.  
The pre-2006 era: Anti-state mobilisation, fragmentation and external 
involvement in Mali’s periphery 
Exploring the origins of the 2006 rebellion is vital to understanding outbreaks of violence that 
followed. Recurring episodes of armed violence in the Republic of Mali’s Northern regions since 
independence have been driven by multiple causes, which various peace processes have failed to 
address. The culmination of these failures led to a major crisis in 2012, when conflict reached an 
unprecedented peak with the occupation by Tuareg separatist forces of Kidal, Gao and Tombouctou, 
the three main cities of the North. The Tuareg separatists were temporarily allied with Salafi-jihadi 
groups (Ansar Eddine, MUJAO and AQIM), but were eventually driven out by these same groups. 
The intensity of violence in Mali has remained relatively moderate compared to other civil wars in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2012, for instance, less than a thousand people per year have been killed 
by violence. However, violence is a daily occurrence, consisting mainly of hit and run attacks, suicide 
bombings (a phenomenon unknown in Mali until 2013), and violence associated with vendettas 
between communities, which take advantage of general unrest to settle scores. Protracted violence 
also disrupts economic life. At its height in 2012, the latest crisis displaced approximately 400,000 
people, either internally or in neighbouring Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and, to a lesser extent, Algeria. 
In March 2017, there were still more than 140,000 refugees in neighbouring countries, itself a 
testimony of the low levels of trust placed in the ongoing peace process by civilian populations.  
Crucially, however, past violence has never been dealt with as part of any official or public 
transitional justice process. The horrific killings that took place during the 1963 repression of the first 
Tuareg rebellion by Malian authorities are still alive in many people’s memories and family 
histories;5 and lists of dead from the 1990s still circulate among activists without being officially 
acknowledged. The major killings of the latest crisis (notably the Aguelhoc massacre in which dozens 
of Malian soldiers died in February 2012) have never been properly investigated. 
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Early Tuareg nationalism 
The story of Tuareg rebellions can be seen primarily as centre-periphery struggles. Indeed, the 
decision made by the first Malian President Modibo Keita and his successors to build a centralised 
state, was inherently hostile to separatist aspirations expressed by minority groups.  
Since colonial times, Tuareg nationalism has led to a series of rebellions, with successive demands 
for further integration, autonomy or, more recently, independence. Just prior to independence in 
1960, Tuaregs, prominently from the Ifoghas tribe and other northern populations, afraid of being 
ruled by Bamako-based Southerners, increasingly made demands for the creation of a Saharan State. 
Their hopes were fed by the willingness of France to keep a hand over the Sahara. In December 
1956, the French National Assembly voted through a bill that created the Organisation commune des 
régions sahariennes (OCRS). Its implicit goal was to maintain France’s control over recently 
discovered oil resources in the Sahara, and over its military installations in case of independence. At 
its creation, the organisation covered a significant territory including the two Saharan regions of 
Algeria and the northern regions of Mali, Niger and Chad. 
The OCRS slowly faded from view, as Algeria became independent. However, between 1957 and 
1960, northern community leaders launched two petitions asking the French authorities to separate 
their territories from Sudan (which would eventually become Mali). The first one was signed by 300 
Tuareg, Arab, and Songhoy leaders from Tombouctou, Gao and Goundam, and the second was 
initiated in Agadez by Tuaregs from the Aïr and signed by all Tuareg leaders from the region. Both 
petitions6 were sent to Charles de Gaulle, then President of the French Republic. While some 
academics assert that French soldiers were behind these initiatives, these petitions were later used 
as evidence by Tuareg rebels to demonstrate the legitimacy of their claims for independence 
throughout their cycles of uprising.  
In 1962, two years after its independence, the young Malian state faced its first Tuareg rebellion in 
Kidal. Its leaders were from the Ifoghas tribe, which had politically benefitted from the French 
presence at the expense of other Tuareg tribes, and did not look favourably upon the transfer of 
power to Bamako. Terrible repression ensued, creating narratives of violence and injustice that 
persist to this day. 
Nationalist revival and the first conflict resolution mechanisms 
In June 1990, the Mouvement populaire de libération de l’Azawad (MPLA hereafter),7 led by Iyad Ag 
Ghali (now famously leading Al Qaeda’s branch in Mali), attacked a Malian gendarmerie post in 
Menaka and started a new rebellion, ending with the Tamanrasset Accords signed on 6 January 
1991. The Tamanrasset Accords were signed by the Chief of Staff of the Malian Armed Forces, 
Colonel Ousmane Coulibaly, and Iyad Ag Ghali representing the Mouvement populaire de l’Azawad 
(MPA), successor of MPLA, and the Front Islamique Arabe (FIA), an Arab militia. Under Algerian 
mediation, a cease-fire was agreed by the parties that signed, and all prisoners were to be freed.  
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The two-page Accord stated that the Malian Armed Forces had to “proceed to a progressive 
reduction of their presence in the 6th and the 7th regions”,8 to “disengage from the running of the 
civil administration”, and to “proceed to the suppression of certain military posts”.9 As a 
consequence, they were “confined to their role of defence of the integrity of the territory at the 
frontiers”. In exchange, MPA and FIA rebels had to be “stabilized within the zones corresponding to 
their current places of cantonment”, to “put an end […] to infiltration of armed elements coming 
from outside” and finally to “integrate the Malian Armed Forces”.10 A “Commission of Ceasing of 
Hostilities”, presided over by Algeria, was also created. It was the first time the government agreed 
to end a rebellion through political agreement, thereby seemingly empowering the insurgents. 
However, this was to make violent, identity-based mobilisation a way to access privilege. 
The signing of what was, essentially, an elite bargain led to the disintegration of the MPA11 into 
multiple tribe-based splinter groups. Six months later, rebellion resumed following a disagreement 
between groups on the implementation of the Accord. Some, like Iyad Ag Ghali’s MPA, were 
partisans of a “diplomatic” resolution whereas others were more radical. Although it was a 
signatory, the MPA became involved in the upsurge of violence under the new umbrella group 
Mouvements et Fronts unifiés de l’Azawad (MFUA)12 comprised of other groups.13 
On April 1992, the Pacte National was signed in Bamako between the MFUA and the interim Malian 
government under the mediation of the Algerian government. Besides a “definitive ceasefire” and 
the creation of a “Cease-Fire Commission”, this new political deal affirmed the “particular status” of 
the North, announced a decentralisation process with the creation of a new administrative system in 
the North, and agreed to the “total integration” of MFUA combatants inside the Malian Armed 
Forces (and the creation of “special units […] composed mostly of integrated MFUA combatants”). 
As with the previous agreement, the Malian Armed Forces had to gradually reduce their presence in 
the North and to redeploy their military installations and outposts outside of urban centres and 
grazing areas.  
The Pacte National addressed the North-South cleavage but not the intra-North political rivalries. As 
stated above, the North is not politically homogenous, and political competition for resource and 
power is fierce. Therefore, national elite bargains that include some and exclude others are not 
sufficient to generate sustainable peace. Instead, communal feuds immediately followed the signing 
of the peace deal, involving those who had not previously taken up arms (including sedentary 
communities) or those who had been poorly represented in the peace deal.  
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 Considered as Ifoghas centric, the Tuareg tribes of Chamanamas and Imghad created splinter groups, respectively the 
Front populaire de libération de l’Azawad (FPLA) and the Armée révolutionnaire de libération de l'Azawad (ARLA). 
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It then took multiple mini-deals to put an end to intra-North violence, via so-called rencontres 
communautaires (community meetings), the most famous being the ‘pact of Bourem’ named after a 
locality situated north of Gao. Crucially, these ‘mini’ elite bargains were initiated by local, unarmed 
power brokers, using their own diplomatic resources. This primarily bottom-up feature of peace-
making is arguably what made them successful, a fact that did not escape the attention of donors 
who, during later episodes of violence, tried to encourage similar formats. However, by effectively 
monetising the process, they eventually de-legitimised it, and donor-sponsored initiatives such as 
the Anefis Accords in 2015 eventually failed to generate peace. 
On 27 March 1996, the “Peace Flames” Ceremony took place in Tombouctou, in which more than 
3,000 weapons were burnt, illustrating the dismantling of the MPA and MFUA. This symbolic event 
put a temporary end to a conflict that had been going on between Tuareg rebels and the Malian 
army since 1990 (and a conflict between Songhai militias and the Malian army since 1994). More 
than 3,000 rebels and militiamen were cantoned in military camps before their integration inside 
Malian forces, and socio-economic projects funded by the international community were also 
offered. A meeting in Tombouctou on July 1995 with representatives of Tuareg groups and 
government officials was organised to assess the needs of Northern Mali’s economy.  
After the Tamanrasset Accord in 1991, armed groups fragmented, following a pattern that has since 
been repeated: once an overarching objective has been achieved, or cannot be pushed further, 
other local demands that have been overlooked eventually lead to further violence. This, in turn, led 
to increasing fragmentation as, typically, the North/South cleavage transformed into cleavages 
within the North. In Mali, there is a strong divide between groups based in Kidal and those based in 
Menaka or Gao, whose respective economic, sociological and political environments differ sharply. 
Fragmentation coincides with the creation of new acronyms that often obscure the essentially 
parochial nature of political re-alignments.14 
Between the surrender of armed groups in 1996 until the 2006 rebellion, there were no major 
incidents of armed violence. However, 14 years after it had been signed, there had been little 
implementation of the Pacte National’s provisions. As a result, a number of Tuareg leaders including 
Iyad Ag Ghali, Hassan Ag Fagaga,15 Ibrahim Ag Bahanga and Ahmada Ag Bibi decided to found a new 
group called the Alliance démocratique du 23 mai pour le changement (ADC) and raided Ménaka and 
Kidal the same day.16 The renewed violence against Malian Armed Forces outposts in Kidal and the 
mutiny in Menaka instigated by the ADC, was a local, low-intensity and short-lived rebellion.  
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Their main demand was to obtain new status for the Kidal region. They did not demand 
independence but wanted further autonomy for their province, disregarding possible similar 
grievances among Tuaregs outside Kidal. A few days later, Hassan Fagaga explained in an interview 
to Jeune Afrique that the “Tuaregs cannot accept indefinitely to live as second-class citizens in their 
own country”. That is why, he explained, they asked for “an autonomy that allows us to handle our 
own affairs within Malian entity”. 17 He also described discrimination against integrated combatants 
and the marginalisation of the North through a lack of development as core causes of this new 
rebellion. 
The Malian president, Amadou Toumani Touré had been involved in the development of the Pacte 
National. When the 2006 rebellion broke out, he knew the actors and the dynamics of Northern 
Mali, and had been in contact with Hassan Ag Fagaga in November 2005, seven months before the 
start of the rebellion.  
The rebel leaders refused the mediation proposed by Northern tribal leaders and Libya, but 
accepted the intervention of Algiers, as with every peace process since 1990. The Algerian 
government asked the rebels to abandon their autonomy demand, and to stay in the Adrar of 
Teghaghar with a ban on contacting other Tuareg organisations in neighbouring countries. In 
exchange, it asked the Malian government to open official talks. The pressure from the rest of the 
international community was minimal, and comprised mainly of promises of financial support to 
development projects in the Kidal region. 
Within three months, a peace agreement was reached through Algerian mediation and the Algiers 
Accords were signed on 4 July 2006, in which the rebels had to relinquish their demands for 
autonomy under pressure from the Algerian government.  
For the most part, the Algiers Accords reaffirmed the principles and provisions of the Pacte National 
but once again failed to create opportunity for the combatants, most of whom were young people 
who had mustered behind Ag Bahanga, to re-negotiate the balance of power between Northern 
elites. Instead, the elites – most notably Iyad Ag Ghaly – maintained the upper hand throughout the 
negotiations, leaving many excluded. As a result, Ag Bahanga and his men continued to fight in the 
area through a new movement called Alliance Touareg Niger-Mali (ATNM), and developed close 
cooperation with the Nigerien Tuareg insurgency active at the time (between 2007 and 2009), the 
Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ). 
Regional powers played a key role in influencing the shifting allegiances within Mali during the 
period. Having been involved in the peace processes in the 1990s, Algeria appeared to be an obvious 
candidate to lead mediation as the 2006 rebellion unfolded. Considered the most charismatic Tuareg 
leader in Northern Mali, Iyad Ag Ghali kept strong ties with Algerian officials who had supported him 
since the MPA rebellion, although Algeria was careful to avoid openly supporting Tuareg rebels.  
Algeria’s role was further complicated by its ambiguous role in the formation of jihadi cells in Mali, 
as it appeared to allow its Islamists militants flee to the desert. This would eventually contribute to 
the formation of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, as the migration of Algerian radicals deeply 
impacted the geopolitical situation in the Sahara-Sahel region.  
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On the Libyan side, as early as 1980, Qadhafi declared Libya the natural homeland of all Tuaregs, 
offering them Libyan residence permits or nationality.18 The droughts of 1974 and 1984 increased 
the number of young men who emigrated, and many went to Libya where they were recruited into 
Qadhafi’s Islamic Legion where they eventually served Qadhafi’s military ventures in Chad, Lebanon 
or Afghanistan. Multiple Malian rebels, including Iyad Ag Ghali and Ibrahim Ag Bahangawere 
enrolled in this corps. Qadhafi’s policy towards Tuaregs explains, in part, the militarisation of 
political claims in Northern Mali.  
But, while Qadhafi’s influence was accepted by some Tuaregs, he never succeeded in being seen by 
Malian authorities as a potential official mediator in peace processes. In April 2006, Qadhafi was in 
Tombouctou to celebrate the birth of the Prophet Mohammed. In front of thousands he invited all 
inhabitants of the Sahara to form a unique entity, from the Senegal river to the Euphrates, to defend 
their territory. During his stay, he also announced the opening of a Libyan consulate in Kidal, 
although no Libyans were living in the city. This visit to Mali is generally considered a forerunner to 
the coming rebellion.  
Algerian and Libyan rivalries played a key role in the fragmentation of rebel groups that led to the 
2006 uprising. Soon after the Algiers Accords were signed in 2006, the ADC combatants were divided 
into two main factions. The first, led by Iyad Ag Ghali, recognised the peace agreement; while the 
second, led by Ag Bahanga, was hostile to its implementation. Algeria and Libya both backed the 
Malian government’s designated mediator, Iyad Ag Ghali, in its attempt to bring Ag Bahanga’s ADC 
faction to negotiate with Malian authorities. During the following months, both Algeria and Libya 
played a prominent role in the release of hostages held by rebel forces.  
The Algiers Accords: an elite bargain with dramatic consequences 
The speed of the peace process under Algerian mediation that successfully reached a peace 
agreement only two months after the attacks is striking. As noted, the Algiers Accords mostly 
reaffirmed the Pacte National’s provisions, but with a focus on Kidal region. The agreement did not 
change the essence of the elite deal, but simply underlined the urgent need to implement what had 
been agreed upon in 1992. However, once more the incapacity of the State to bring about proper 
reforms sowed the seeds of the 2012 rebellion.  
A hasty, unambitious agreement doomed to non-implementation 
The full title of the Algiers Accords is indicative of its narrow scope: namely, the “Algiers Accords of 
2006: Restoration of peace, security, and development in the region of Kidal”. The agreement had a 
unique focus on the Kidal region, created by the 1992 Pacte National, but did not seek to address 
the challenges that arose from the non-implementation of the Pacte National in the two other 
northern regions.  
The main provisions of the Algiers Accords included the creation of a regional assembly with the 
power of consultation on legislation affecting the Kidal region; the organisation of a forum in Kidal 
with international donors; the building of new infrastructure (an airport in Kidal, the extension of 
electricity and phone networks, and roads from Kidal to Gao, Ménaka, and Algeria); the renewal of 
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the (not previously implemented) ten-year preferential tax regime meant to stimulate economic 
development; and the reintegration of deserters into the Malian army. 
Soon after the Accords were signed, they faced the same political opposition that earlier deals had. 
Nearly 90 percent of the Malian population live in southern regions and dominate the government, 
the administration and the armed forces. Southern elites and their constituencies have resisted the 
greater representation of Tuaregs and other northern communities in national institutions. Southern 
criticism of the Accords was underpinned by an historic animosity towards Arabs and Tuaregs who 
raided sub-Saharan populations for decades and forced them into slavery. They accused northern 
populations of using arms against the Malian state to obtain exclusive advantages. 
Misunderstood by politicians and the wider population in the south, the Algiers Accords were 
perceived as the surrender of the Malian state. Despite a communications campaign that sought to 
explain the terms of the Accords, national elections a few months after the signing of the Accords 
silenced all remaining supportive voices. As a consequence, the government showed little 
willingness to implement the Accords.  
Nonetheless, the leader of the ADC, Amada Ag Bibi and General Kafougouna Koné, met in Algiers 
and signed a memorandum on February 2007 detailing the schedule of the Accords’ 
implementation. They planned to hold a Forum with international donors for Kidal’s development. 
But this also ran into opposition from southern Malians who decried their own poverty and poor 
access to public services.  
The Aftermath of the 2006 Algiers Accords   
Over the longer term, the Accords also ushered in new forms of behaviour that would eventually 
precipitate the outbreak of a further crisis in 2012, as well as a new era of Tuareg activism, sowing 
the seeds for a growing jihadi presence in the region. In many respects, the 2006 Algiers Accords 
underpinned the rise of new political and social dynamics. New forms of militancy emerged as a 
consequence, and dissent that had been formerly expressed through nationalist idioms was replaced 
with a jihadist agenda.19 At the same time, booming cross-border drug trafficking and a nascent 
hostage-taking business brought to the fore of the Northern political economy new commercial 
elites, who later played a key political and economic role in Mali. Key protagonists among Northern 
Mali’s elite developed strong international connections, which had an impact on their ability to 
influence and leverage other political players. A re-positioning of the government’s relationship with 
Northern actors occurred, and previous political settlements were seriously disrupted. With regard 
to the Tauregs, three key dynamics occurred, which signalled the dysfunctional nature of the deal 
and paved the way for future mobilisation.  
First, the ‘dividends’ of the peace deal were appropriated by a small clique – or at least not shared 
widely enough to satisfy various communities’ demands. Iyad Ag Ghaly (who was offered a 
diplomatic job in Saudi Arabia) and other Tuareg leaders in charge of ‘projects’ to promote economic 
and social development soon started to be seen as “Bamako’s Tuaregs”, enjoying personal comfort 
and not contributing to the collective well-being. Grudges against leaders took a parochial turn: non 
Ifoghas, Kidal-based Tuareg leaders blamed the Ifoghas for using the dividends of peace exclusively 
(possibly to divert attention from their own misuse of public money) and sporadically threatened the 
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fragile political order. In short, power devolved to Northern elites who consolidated their patronage 
networks and own power, as had been the case in the 1990s.20 
Second, and partly as a result of a political system dominated by elders, a generational change 
occurred among Tuareg activists. As indicated above, while the main mobilisation processes tend to 
occur along parochial lines, youth activists began to have an important voice within their 
communities. The Mouvement national de l’Azawad (MNA), which directly stemmed from campus 
activism and was led by Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, himself a young man, explicitly advocated for 
separatism, leading to Moussa Ag Acharatoumane spending a few weeks in prison. This episode 
immediately made him the flag bearer of the new protests against established elites, both among 
Tuareg circles and beyond. The MNA later became the intellectual focal point for the Mouvement 
national de libération de l’Azawad (which Moussa Ag Acharatoumane eventually left in 2016 to form 
his own faction, somewhat ironically in defence of his Dawsahak community). 
Third, while some of the youth opted for campus activism, others opted for a more “adventurous” 
lifestyle embodied by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, and later his older cousin Ag Fagaga. They included 
criminalised youth who were involved in cross-border smuggling and anti-state activism, some of 
whom joined Islamic movements such as the quietist Tablighi Jamaat.21 The old way of governing 
Northern Mali through intermediaries mandated by successive governments was proving 
increasingly unsustainable. Recourse to influential Tuareg leaders as intermediaries had traditionally 
allowed the central authorities to postpone institutional reforms and avoid a move towards 
federalism.   
Instead, the government opted for an indirect approach, seeking to control the North through the 
use of proxy militias, recruited among Northerners who opposed greater independence for the 
Tuaregs.  
The Tuareg leader, Bahanga, whose group had not signed up to the Algiers Accords was involved in 
the hijacking of traffickers linked to Arab traders, based in Gao or Timbuktu. The state had no 
capacity to deploy its troops in the North and such a move would anyway have triggered fierce 
resistance.22 This triggered concern among Arab businessmen, who reactivated a dedicated militia to 
protect their activities. An Arab officer, Colonel Ould Meydou, was appointed commander of the 
force, with the agreement of the government. The body formed was not a militia per se since its 
personnel enjoyed official enlistment in army ranks, but in practice Col. Ould Meydou was free to 
pick his recruits on an ethnic basis and lead the counterinsurgency.  
A parallel counterinsurgent force, called Delta, was formed at the same time, led by El Hadj Ag 
Gamou, the Imghad commander, who, like Ould Meydou, recruited his own combatants. While both 
Ould Meydou and Gamou denied that their troops formed militias, at the very least this is how they 
were perceived by leaders from other groups. These forces eventually drove out Bahanga, but then 
became de facto instruments of pro-government armed politics in the North at a time when the 
Ifoghas and other tribes were using civil society channels (such as a Switzerland-funded ‘Network for 
Peace’) to voice their discontent about the criminalised forms of governance and electoral politics 
that were developing under the patronage of Gamou and Ould Meydou. 
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The business elites behind the militias outlined above gained increasing influence around the mid-
2000s, and transformed Northern Mali (and notably places like Ber, Gao or Tabankort) into a highly 
profitable drug-trafficking business23 involving cannabis from Morocco, and cocaine from Latin 
America. In the mid-2000s, cocaine traffickers from Colombia and Venezuela had re-routed their 
business via West Africa as the direct route to Europe became too tightly controlled. Although 
Malian operators in this global trade remain minor players, and Mali remained a transit zone, the 
proceeds accumulated in Mali made those players extremely wealthy in Mali. It allowed them to 
expand their economic influence through investment in the licit economy (including public transport, 
public works and well drilling), making them inescapable business partners for the state, NGOs and 
others. 
The emergence of these new Arab elites dramatically transformed the intragroup power balance, 
particularly as the tribes leading these businesses were traditionally low status. Business disputes 
also resulted in violence, barely concealed behind the political façade of existing armed groups. For 
instance, in 2009 a Boeing 767 aircraft landed on a hidden runway near Bourem, North of Gao, the 
hotbed of an Arab tribe, whose members were known for actively participating in drug trafficking. 
When it landed it was full of cocaine, but only the skeleton of the burnt plane was found by the 
authorities and the cargo had vanished. Arab leaders started accusing each other of stealing the 
drugs, and a number of them ended up in prison only to be released later at Col. Ould Meydou’s 
request. This episode not only shows the close entanglement of militia politics with trafficking, but 
also demonstrates the extent to which these new economic rivalries were undermining earlier elite 
bargains and the wider settlement 
Another crucial element that empowered criminal elites were the jihadi militants who enjoyed 
relative safety in Northern Mali in the mid-2000s, and developed a lucrative hostage business. By 
2012, it is thought that payment of ransoms by Western countries to release hostages amounted to 
EUR 150 million.24 A number of Arab elites had effectively carved out a safe haven for jihadis (see 
below) and had become natural brokers in the negotiations for the release of hostages, taking their 
cut in the ransom payments. 
In the late 1990s, a small group of jihadis arrived in Northern Mali from Algeria. This was the 
beginning of a significant change in Northern Mali’s political landscape, culminating in the 
occupation of the North by jihadi forces in 2012. The point of this section is not to narrate in detail 
the rise of jihadism in Mali, but to sketch the changes it introduced in a context of existing and 
fragile political settlements.  
Politically, the presence of new armed players challenged existing forces. However, it was not the 
state that was worst affected by this shift, but the separatists whose nationalist political agenda was 
diametrically opposed to the jihadis desire to enforce Sharia law. Antagonism to the state proved 
more lenient: as explained above, those appointed to govern the North on behalf of the state 
identified with the jihadis as their anti-separatist agendas converged. Interestingly, the opportunity 
to ally with a new militant group became a vehicle for revenge among those who felt side-lined by 
others militants. The trajectory of Iyad Ag Ghaly exemplifies this logic: disappointed by the fate of 
separatist militancy and partly rejected by the younger generation of activists, he recycled his 
warrior capital under the jihadi banner in order to settle scores with his former companions. 
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Economically, proceeds from hostage-taking ransoms not only helped jihadis acquire arms, but also, 
crucially, helped them to integrate into local economies and start winning hearts and minds. Jihadis 
became generous neighbours of Timbuktu’s communities, then moved further East in Gao after a 
partial split, and in the Adrar mountains, further North (under the protection of Iyad Ag Ghaly). They 
paid for their upkeep handsomely and recruited many locals as a result. Their low-profile attitude 
and gradual approach towards populations was deliberate and in line with Al Qaeda’s doctrine. 
Despite some successes in counter-terrorism operations, the penetration of jihadi militants into 
Northern Mali society did not stop and even accelerated over the years. In the second half of the 
2000s, the growing number of marriages between local women and foreign jihadists, mostly 
Algerians, is case in point. According to AQIM reports discovered in Northern Mali’s main cities 
following French operation Serval, the relationships that jihadists had with local tribes were 
considered of strategic importance to the AQIM leadership. 
Counter-terrorism: The growing presence of actors from outside the region 
Following a French, US and UK decision to coordinate their respective military cooperation 
programmes with African partners, in 1998 France decided to create a new programme called 
RECAMP – Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix – dedicated to 
strengthening the African peacekeeping capabilities through tactical training, formation, technical 
assistance and projection support in case of a crisis situation.  
Cooperation in counter-terror efforts between Sahelian countries and Non-African partners then 
developed from 2002 following growing jihadi threats across the Sahara Desert. Indeed, US 
involvement in Sahara region began in the early 2000s soon after the 9/11 attacks. President Bush 
and Algerian President Bouteflika met in Washington in November 2001 to discuss cooperation in 
the war against terrorism. Two factors accelerated US focus on the Sahara region. First, Algerian 
salafi-jihadi insurgent groups were expanding southward; and second, the US administration was 
eager to reduce its dependence on Middle East oil, and saw access to Africa’s oil supplies as being of 
strategic national interest. Within a few years, the US was Algeria’s largest foreign investor in 
hydrocarbons, amounting to $22 billion in trade in 2008. 
In 2002, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) was placed on the US list of terrorist 
organisations, which led to an increased focus by the US administration on the borderlands between 
Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Libya. Former US Ambassador to Mali, Vicki Huddleston, warned 
as early as 2004 that Algerian extremists shared a “bond” with the Tuareg and Arabs tribes of 
Northern Mali. In the mid-2000s, GSPC tried to extract revenues from informal licit and illicit trade of 
goods across Sahara Desert. For instance, the prominent jihadi leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar allegedly 
gained fame as a cigarette smuggler, which owed him the nickname “Mr. Marlboro”. 
In November 2002, focused on GSPC activities, the US launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) in four 
Sahelian countries: Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. US Special Operations Forces (SOF) were 
deployed in these countries to provide training and equipment in order to improve border security 
and avoid the growth of jihadi havens. The creation of rapid-reaction forces to pursue terrorists was 
part of the US initiative, but appears to have been a total failure in Mali despite the fact that more 
than half of the PSI budget was focused on Northern Mali. Nonetheless, the capture of GSPC cell 
leader “El Para” by Chadian armed forces in 2004, after a two-month pursuit involving troops from 
Mali and Niger and support from Algerian and US forces (air and logistic support, intelligence 





Formerly a lieutenant of GSPC leader, Hassan Hattab, he became a jihadi kingpin by kidnapping 32 
European tourists in 2003 and killing 43 Algerian soldiers a few months later.  
This event led to the expansion of the scope and budget of the PSI, which was renamed Trans-
Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)25 in 2004. Up from $7.75 million in 2003, the US 
Congress approved a $100 million annual budget for TSCTP, fearing the spread of Al Qaida training 
camps across the Sahara. A new focus was developed on illicit trafficking in arms, drugs and labour 
migrants.  
Under the Obama administration, TSCTP has been progressively absorbed by US Africa Command 
(AFRICOM), responsible for all military affairs in Africa since 2007.26 To deflect the AQIM threat in 
Mali, in 2009 President Obama endorsed a $5 million military assistance package to Malian armed 
forces through the Counter Terrorism Train and Equip (CTTE) programme.  
France launched Operation Sabre in the Sahara-Sahel region in 2009. Sabre’s main goal was to assess 
jihadi threats in the region and eventually take on the terrorists. Only a few French Special Forces 
were thought to have been based in Atar (Mauritania) initially, before other teams were sent to 
Mopti (Mali) and Niger after the kidnapping of French uranium company AREVA workers. However, 
the 2012 rebellion and spreading of Salafi-Jihadi threats across the Sahel painfully underlined the 
inefficiency of these successive programmes. Until then, the French and US military presence in Mali 
had been limited, focussed on discrete Special Forces operations and training missions for the 
Malian army. The occupation of northern Mali by jihadis dramatically changed this state of affairs, 
and provoked a tactical rapprochement between the French and the Tuareg separatists. Reactivating 
memories of collaboration between French colonial troops and Tuaregs, France decided to rely on 
MNLA fighters to counter Jihadi groups, using them as guides in order to access Adrar des Ifoghas, 
located East of Kidal, where many Jihadists found refuge.  
The cooperation between French troops and Tuareg rebels, accompanied by an abandonment of 
claims for independence and high military involvement of the international community in the North, 
undermined the separatist movement’s credibility. Despite losses following French intervention, Iyad 
Ag Ghali’s Ansar Eddine and AQIM’s affiliates succeeded in convincing a number of Northern youth 
and ex-rebels that they would be the only group to make no concessions to the Malian and 
International authorities.   
2012-15: Renewed violence  
Large-scale rebellion as a consequence of failures in the 2006 deal  
Direct threat to Malian territorial integrity 
As noted, the 2006 Algiers Accords, and the elite bargain it enshrined led to a series of shifts in the 
political settlement, and an unprecedented crisis, probably the most severe the Malian state had to 
deal with since its independence. Malian armed forces were expelled from across the North by 
rebels demanding independence for Azawad, territory corresponding to the three Northern regions 
(Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal). Salafi-jihadi groups like MUJAO, AQIM and its affiliates overwhelmed 
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rebel groups and took control of Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal, where they applied Sharia law. A 
number of prominent Tuareg leaders, including Iyad Ag Ghali, shifted from rebellion to jihad. The 
Malian Armed Forces deserted all of its northern outposts, threatening the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the state. These events provoked a military coup in Bamako, deepening the crisis 
even further.  
Consequences of the 2006 political settlements 
The poor implementation of the 2006 Algiers Accords’ provisions was undoubtedly at the core of the 
return to violence in 2012. While the Accords in theory granted northern Mali further political 
autonomy and more development funds, Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré only launched 
the main development programme in 2011, more than four years after the deal was signed. Known 
as the Special Programme for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali (Programme 
spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement du Nord Mali, or PSPSDN), the programme was 
much criticised for being poorly funded, and its managers were accused of corruption.  
The programme’s murky management as well as its intention to redeploy the army in the North (and 
make the military outposts sources of local development) are seen as reasons behind the MNLA 
formation in the same year. Indeed, the MNA, predecessor of MNLA, had opposed the programme 
in September 2011. Besides non-implementation, the relapse into violence was accelerated by a 
harsh geopolitical environment (including the war in Libya and the entrenchment of jihadi groups) 
and by a growing generational divide between Tuareg youth and senior leaders involved in former 
peace processes. For years, Touré had tried to implement political deals agreed after the 2006 
Rebellion, mostly by appointing rebel leaders into the Malian administration and integrating rebel 
fighters into the armed forces. But these national-level elite bargains with rebel leaders appeared to 
be a total failure: Ag Fagaga left the army again in 2007, and Iyad Ag Ghali was expelled from his 
diplomatic post in Saudi Arabia because of his growing connections with Islamic extremists. The 
launch of the PSPDN development programme, decentralisation reform and the creation of new 
regions came far too late, and new grievances were already growing in the North.  
The 2015 Algiers Accord: repeating past mistakes 
The Peace and Reconciliation Accord of 2015 (confusingly and commonly also called the Algiers 
Accord) was signed in Bamako on 15 May 2015 by the Malian government, loyalist armed groups 
and international community representatives (including Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritanie, Niger, 
Nigeria, Chad, AU, UN, ECOWAS, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, EU and France). Initially, no 
rebel groups signed due to ongoing battles against loyalist groups around Ménaka city. Finally, under 
international pressure, a broad -based rebel coalition of separatist rebels, the Coordination of 
Azawad Movements (CMA), signed the peace agreement on 20 June 2015.  
The Algiers Accord was once again crafted in line with the Pacte National provisions in its attempt to 
address core structural issues through institutional reform and further decentralisation – while 
denying further autonomy to Northern regions or any form of federalism. Thus, it reaffirmed 
“respect for national unity, territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the state of Mali, as well as its 
republican and secular character.” It called for “balanced development” and a “fight against 
corruption and impunity.” Regarding Tuareg insurgents’ demands, the peace agreement included 
the creation of locally elected “Regional Assemblies” to be granted large autonomy and resources 
(30% of national revenue); the establishment of a Senate to increase representation of northern 
minorities in national institutions; the setting up of “Development Zones of the Northern Regions,” 





the same level as the rest of the country in terms of development indicators,”; and, finally, for funds 
from donors.  
However, this attempt to resurrect the 1992 Pacte National ultimately failed: it disregarded the 
jihadi presence in Northern Mali who had, by this time, taken root in Northern Mali and, as a result, 
modified local elite bargains and reshaped the political settlement by taking over rebel groups and 
by governing main cities and implementing Sharia Law. 
The French intervention was explicitly aimed at defeating the jihadi groups. Meanwhile, the United 
Nations Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), was established in 2013 to provide technical and 
financial support in order to try and avoid past failures to implement peace agreements. It is clear 
that without French and UN intervention, the political settlements in Mali would have been 
fundamentally different to that seen today. 
France’s Operation Serval shaped local bargaining processes in a way which eventually recalls post-
2006 arrangements. The Malian government succeeded in integrating pro-Mali militias – whose 
structure was close to those set up to drive away Bahanga after 2006 – as a way of counterbalancing 
the weight of separatists. Just as happened two decades earlier, a North/South cleavage would then 
transform into cleavages between different groups in the North, still as yet unresolved. Meanwhile, 
a number of Ifoghas who followed Iyad Ag Ghaly into his jihadi group, Ansar Eddine, created a 
splinter group called Mouvement Islamique de l’Azawad (MIA) before merging with a political entity, 
the Haut Conseil de l’Azawad (HCA), which was eventually renamed Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de 
l’Azawad (HCUA). This was a way to ensure that Ifoghas ruling family would not be excluded from 
future local bargains and political deal making. Of course, following the French intervention, those 
excluded from the various local bargains and peace agreements at the insistence of the West would 
become the fiercest spoilers under AQIM patronage. Most Northern communities are now torn 
apart between those who adhered to the peace process and those who joined jihadi militancy. A 
new cleavage has been added to an already complex series of nested cleavages. But this new 
cleavage has a specific feature: being framed in the ‘war on terror’ narrative, it is exclusively treated 
through military means. 
Conclusion 
Making sense of Mali’s multiple episodes of crises is a considerable challenge, given the endlessly 
fluid and shifting allegiances among the key players. The official and unofficial interference of 
foreign actors has further complicated the situation, as has the rise of the various jihadi actors.  
While the coexistence of macro- and micro-level cleavages is commonplace in civil wars, it is a 
particularly defining feature of Malian politics. Broad-based coalitions cyclically challenge the 
Government of Mali’s authority against a backdrop of social, economic and political tensions 
between the centre and the periphery. Yet the periphery is, itself, a highly contested political arena, 
leading to communal feuds that are easily exploited by the government as a counterinsurgency 
strategy and requiring tailored, micro-level peace-making efforts to complement national peace 
deals.  
The 2006 elite bargain was limited in scope and ambition, reflecting the limited scope and ambition 
of the uprising itself. However, the management of this peace process exemplifies the failings of 





undermined by unofficial strategies. It was these failures that planted the seeds of the 2012 
rebellion. 
The 2015 peace agreement that followed the 2012 round of violence repeats many of mistakes of 
earlier iterations. As a result, the government continues to govern the North through armed proxies 
whose political and business interests coincide; and foreign involvement is ambiguous and lacks 
partiality. 
The French intervention and the wider international presence in Mali could perhaps have done more 
to secure the 2015 agreement by monitoring the implementation of its provisions. However, this de 
facto neo-trusteeship became entangled in many of the complexities of Malian politics. Worryingly, 
two recent trends have emerged. First, Islamist militants have strengthened their influence by 
gathering support from those disappointed by the repeated failures to bring peace and the 
inequalities of the existing political settlement. Second, the micro-level diplomatic resources capable 
of stopping local vendettas seem to have been exhausted, as armed actors have repeatedly 
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